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Abstract 
This paper, prepared for the 2001 Washburn Torts Seminar, argues that tort 
law has some properties that make it superior to statute-based regulatory schemes as 
a system of environmental protection.  In particular, two arguments, one based on 
enforcer-malfeasance and one based on information, suggest that tort law is 
preferable to statutory regulation.  I sketch these arguments and apply them to 
nuisance law.  The result is a set of conditions or rules-of-thumb for determining 
where tort law is preferable to environmental regulation.  The framework implies 
that emission standard regulation can and should be implemented without 
preempting nuisance law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Professor of Law and Law Alumni Distinguished Scholar, Boston University, 
knhylton@bu.edu. 
 
 
 1
WHEN SHOULD WE PREFER TORT LAW TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION? 
 
Keith N. Hylton 
 
 
There are two broad models of regulation: statutory schemes carried out by 
administrative agencies with the help of public enforcement agents, and highly 
discretionary common law rules developed over time through litigation.  
Environmental regulation is dominated by the first model, with relatively little of it 
done through litigation of tort claims.  The reason may be largely historical: tort law 
has always been viewed as local in design and impact, while environmental law has 
always had a global aim.  But it need not be this way.  More than anything, tort law 
has been flexible, and thus capable of responding to new problems. 
I will argue that tort law has some important properties that make it superior 
to statute-based regulatory schemes as a system of environmental protection.  In the 
end, I will not argue that environmental law should be scrapped in favor of tort law.  
However, I hope to lay out some general rules for determining where tort law is 
potentially superior to statutory regulation. 
 
I. ENFORCEMENT REGIMES 
 
Law enforcement regimes can be grouped into the public or private category, 
where public involves government enforcement agents, and private involves suits 
brought by citizens.  These categories can be broken down further.  Public 
enforcement can be geared toward requiring compliance with a set of conduct rules, 
or simply charging taxes or prices for every rule violation.  Robert Cooter once 
described the choice as between “sanctions” and “prices.”1  Under the sanctioning 
approach, the enforcement authority demands compliance with a particular rule, 
perhaps under the threat of incarceration.  Under pricing, the enforcement authority 
leaves it up to the individual to decide whether he will comply, as long as he pays the 
price for non-compliance.  This gives us two types of public enforcement regime: 
public with controls, and public with prices. 
The private enforcement category includes two important subdivisions.  The 
state can grant private rights of action to collect damages from the entity responsible 
for a particular harm without requiring proof of illegal conduct.  This is private 
enforcement with prices, and is commonly referred to as strict liability.  The 
alternative is what we see more often in the common law; the right to sue for 
violations of common law rules, such as negligence, or nuisance, or defamation.  
This also involves prices, but the pricing rule is more complicated.  In order to 
collect damages under most common law actions, the plaintiff has to prove that the 
defendant violated some conduct norm.  This gives us two types of private 
enforcement regimes: private with strict liability, and private with conduct norms. 
My rough categorization of enforcement regimes can be applied immediately 
to the regulation of environmental damage.  The existing regulatory framework in 
                                                 
1 Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
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the US is much closer to the public-with-controls category than to the other three.2  
We have environmental statutes and administrative rules that specify emission levels 
for environmental pollutants, and enforcement agents that monitor compliance with 
specific emission requirements.  A firm could, in theory, violate the rules and pay the 
fines, but the whole structure of environmental regulation has been aimed toward 
commanding compliance with rules rather than paying the price and getting on with 
your business.  How would environmental regulation be implemented under the 
other three general categories? 
 Public-with-prices environmental regulation would require the government to 
determine the monetary costs of injuries connected to environmental harm.  Thus, if 
an identified level of groundwater contamination raised the cancer rate by five 
percent, the government would determine the cost of this unit – in terms of forgone 
earnings, enjoyment of life, and other losses connected to cancer.  Monitors who 
discover instances of contamination would simply tax the responsible firm an 
amount that internalizes this cost.  Under this system, firms would be able to pay the 
price and get on with business.  If the benefit to the firm (in terms of cost savings or 
increased revenue) of contaminating the ground water were greater than the harms 
imposed on others, firms would pay the price and continue to pollute.  From a cost-
benefit perspective, this result would be optimal: firms would pollute when, and only 
when, the benefits to them outweigh the costs to others.  This regime would require a 
quite different regulatory philosophically from what we have today. 
 Now let us consider the private enforcement regimes.  Private with strict 
liability would, as I suggested earlier, allow anyone harmed by environmental 
damage to sue for the amount of his harm.  There would be relatively little inquiry in 
this system into whether the defendant violated any particular legal standard 
regarding conduct.  Ideally, this system would be equivalent to the public-with-prices 
regime.  Knowing that they would have to pay the price for any harm, firms would 
pollute when and only when the benefit to them exceeded the harm to potential 
victims.  Some might argue that the common law fits under this category, but I will 
argue below that it does not.  Pure strict liability, in the sense that the potential 
defendant “acts at his peril,” is not observed in the common law. 
 The second private enforcement category, private-with-conduct norms, 
encompasses the common law.  The common law rules governing environmental 
damage are primarily trespass, nuisance, and the Rylands-based (strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities) case law.  Of these areas, trespass is the only one 
that approximates strict liability, though even here there has been a traditional 
requirement that the defendant be aware of his conduct and that it be voluntary.  The 
nuisance and Rylands case law have developed rules, such as locality and coming-to-
the-nuisance, which make liability for environmental damage far from strict.  The 
primary difference between the common law regime and the hypothetical strict 
liability regime is that the common law involves a detailed inquiry into the 
defendant’s conduct or general activity. 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of the reasons why command-and-control dominates, see Nathaniel O. Keohane, 
Richard L. Revesz, & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, 22 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 313 (1998). 
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 The issues generated by these categories are pretty straightforward.  First, is 
public enforcement preferable to private enforcement?  In other words, are any of the 
two public regimes likely to be preferable to the two private regimes?  Second, 
which type of private enforcement regime is preferable, strict liability or liability 
under conduct norms? 
 
II. THE CASE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
 
Why should we have public enforcement at all?  Probably the strongest 
argument is that a desirable degree of deterrence can be achieved only through public 
enforcement in some cases.3  Suppose, for example, a firm carries drums of toxic 
chemicals across town and dumps them into a river in the middle of the night, when 
no one is around to see.  People who live downstream are hurt, but they have no way 
of figuring out who is the responsible party.  Suppose the likelihood of the 
responsible firm being caught is only 1 percent.  Suppose the total harm suffered by 
victims is $1 million.  The firm’s expected penalty under a private enforcement 
regime (in which victims sue for the losses) is at most $10,000. 
 Public enforcement is potentially superior in this scenario for several reasons.  
First, public enforcement agents can be paid to undertake the sort of investigation 
that private plaintiffs would be unwilling to make on their own.  If there are one 
hundred victims in my “Midnight Dumper” scenario, so that the harm per victim is 
$10,000, then no one would invest more than this amount into determining the 
identity of the chemical dumper.  Moreover, given the high likelihood that the first 
person who identifies the dumper would be followed by 99 others who would sue for 
the same harm, each victim has an incentive to wait for someone else to take on the 
cost of identifying the dumper.  Public enforcement avoids these problems and 
therefore raises the likelihood of detection in cases involving low-detection-
probability harms. 
 Second, suppose everyone knows the identity of the dumper, but the cost of 
bringing a lawsuit is $10,000.  In this case, even though every victim knows who 
dumped the chemicals, no one will bring a lawsuit because the maximum net award 
would be zero.  Since no one will sue, the dumper’s expected liability is zero.  Of 
course, the courts could permit a class action suit in this example, which is one way 
of solving the problem of low prosecution incentives.  But some victims may choose 
not to join the suit and not to sue individually, and the lawyer may sell out his class 
for an inadequate settlement in return for a large fee.  Public enforcement is an 
obvious alternative that could be preferable. 
The third argument for public enforcement has to do with the size of the 
punishment.  Again, assume the probability of detection is low, and yet the victims 
somehow identify the dumper.  They all sue and each one collects his $10,000 
damage award.  Is everything fine in this scenario?  No.  In order to deter future 
violations, punishment levels should be set so that the expected liability to the 
                                                 
3 For a brief discussion of the reasons for public enforcement generally consistent with the argument 
here, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 46 (2000).  The Polinsky and Shavell review largely examines the optimal 
approach to public enforcement rather than the reasons for public enforcement. 
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dumper is substantial.  If the probability of detection is only one percent, total 
damages should be set at $1 million per victim in order to raise expected liability to 
$1 million, a level that equals the expected harm.  At this level, the dumper would be 
deterred from dumping whenever his private benefits were too small to make it 
worthwhile for him to both pollute and compensate all of his victims in full.  In 
theory, courts could achieve this result by awarding punitive damages in each case.  
But punitive awards are based on the defendant’s conduct (intentional, malicious), 
not on the probability of detection.4  Though conduct and detection probabilities are 
likely to be related, since people who harm intentionally will to try to hide their 
activity, we cannot be sure that ordinary standards for punitive awards will be 
appropriate for the low detection probability case.  Public enforcement is 
theoretically superior in this case. 
 More generally, public enforcement appears attractive whenever the 
probability of punishment under a private regime appears to be low.  The probability 
of punishment is the product of three other probabilities: the probability of detection, 
the probability of prosecution (given detection), and the probability of punishment 
(given detection and prosecution).  We see public enforcement of many common law 
crimes, such as murder, precisely because the probability of punishment is low under 
a private regime.  Murderers are likely to hide their work, making detection difficult.  
Moreover, under a private enforcement regime, a murderer would have an incentive 
to kill off all of the people who would have an incentive to sue (family members of 
the target).  Finally, given the low detection and prosecution probabilities, the 
damages assessed in the end in successful prosecutions would be far too small to 
serve as an adequate deterrent to future murderers. 
 As the Midnight Dumper example suggests, environmental regulation 
appears to be an ideal area for public enforcement.  Detection probabilities are often 
low.  If your well water has been contaminated, would you know whom to sue?  
Probabilities of prosecution conditional on detection are not generally subject to 
manipulation, as in the case of murder.  However, given the widespread nature of the 
harms, a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” will often be observed at the enforcement stage.  
Each victim will have an incentive to wait for some other victim to bear the cost of 
bringing the first action.  Moreover, if the cost of suit is substantial, a large 
percentage of the victims may never have an incentive to sue.  Finally, simple 
compensatory damages may be insufficient in these cases to provide the appropriate 
level of deterrence, given the low level of detection. 
 Whether public enforcement should take the command-and-control or pricing 
approach is less clear, though this argument leans in favor of pricing.  The pricing 
approach should require less information gathering by administrative agencies if 
those agencies have to monitor conduct at a detailed level – e.g., monitoring 
emission levels.  In addition, it has the benefit of not leading to “inefficient 
enforcement” where the costs of compliance are far greater than the benefits.  On the 
other hand, the pricing approach can be difficult to enforce since it may require more 
information in some cases than is required under control schemes.  It may be much 
cheaper to simply demand that a firm stop exceeding an emission standard than to 
                                                 
4 For a proposal to base punitive awards on the probability of liability, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). 
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find the price that internalizes the appropriate level of external costs.  I will return to 
this later. 
 
III. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE COMMON LAW REGIME 
 
Though the case seems straightforward for public enforcement, there are two 
powerful countervailing arguments for private enforcement.  I think they dissolve the 
basis for any presumption favoring public enforcement, and provide a case for 
preferring the common law regime in some areas,5 suitably updated. 
 
A. Malfeasance 
 
Public enforcement agents do not always have the right incentives.  They are 
motivated by paychecks and promises of promotion within the public enforcement 
agency.  However, unlike private plaintiff’s lawyers, there is no strong connection 
between their interests and those of the potential victims they are supposed to 
protect.  Pubic enforcement agents are vulnerable to bribery from third parties or 
from the class of offenders they are supposed to monitor.  To use Jensen and 
Meckling’s terminology, there are substantial “agency costs” in the public 
enforcement system.6 
 One solution to the enforcer malfeasance problem was proposed by Gary 
Becker and George Stigler:7 a scheme of private enforcement in which enforcement 
agents collect fines directly from offenders could be superior to the ordinary 
approach of salaried public enforcement agents.  If the fines were set at the right 
level, the result would be optimal in the sense that potential offenders would violate 
the law only when their benefits exceeded the costs to others, and agents would not 
dilute the deterrence effect of enforcement by accepting bribes. 
 How does this work?  Return to the Midnight Dumper hypothetical.  The 
appropriate fine per injury, recall, is $1 million.  If we multiply $1 million by one 
percent, we get $10,000, which is the monetary level of harm in each case of injury.  
Imagine a system in which private enforcement agents are authorized to collect this 
fine for each injury they identify.  Suppose the Midnight Dumper sees the private 
enforcer approaching his doorstep to serve him with a fine assessment.  Midnight 
Dumper might try to bribe the enforcer by offering to pay him a substantial amount, 
say $5000.  Under the traditional public regime, a salaried public enforcement agent 
might accept the $5000 and agree not to bother the dumper.  Under the private 
regime the enforcer will not accept a bribe less than $1 million.  If Midnight Dumper 
chooses to bribe the enforcer by paying him $1 million, then he has effectively paid 
                                                 
5 For a strong version of the argument in favor of the common law, see Roger Meiners & Bruce 
Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 
(1999).  I agree with most of their argument, though my conclusions differ in some respects from 
theirs. 
6 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
7 Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of 
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974). 
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the right level of the penalty.  In other words, bribery is not a problem in the 
privatized enforcement regime. 
 We do not have a system in place that is a precise mirror image of the 
privatized enforcement regime I just described.  However, private enforcement 
through tort litigation comes closest to this system.  Although damages are not set by 
courts in order to correct for low detection probabilities, there is a fair chance that 
the damage levels set for these cases come close to the amount required to provide 
the appropriate level of deterrence.  Offenders who hide their conduct (midnight 
dumping) are likely to be found by the court to have acted intentionally, which 
would justify a punitive award.  As long as the punitive award is sufficient to wipe 
out any gains the tortfeasor may have gotten from midnight dumping, the litigation 
process will have worked as a deterrent.  There is evidence that punitive damage 
awards are aimed to wipe out tortfeasors’ gains.8 
 Moreover, the private litigation system has the desirable property that 
overzealous (and potentially arbitrary) enforcement is unlikely to occur.  By 
overzealous enforcement, I refer to the case in which enforcement agents spend $1 
million to stop a harm that costs $10,000.  The risk regulation literature has already 
shown that such cases exist: Viscusi and Hamilton found that the average cost per 
cancer case averted at a Superfund site is more than $10 billion.9 
 How does the litigation system avoid the overzealous enforcement problem?  
The problem of overdeterrence – of forcing potential tortfeasors to spend $1 to avoid 
a harm of 10 cents – is handled very easily through liability rules.  If the Midnight 
Dumper knows that his expected liability for dumping is $1 million (which is the 
true harm), he will try to find a less expensive way to dispose of the chemicals.  
However, he will not spend $10 million to avoid the harm. 
 In addition to overdeterrence, there is another feature of overzealous 
enforcement that private litigation avoids.  I will call this second feature the Bleak 
House phenomenon.10  I am referring to the case in which the enforcement 
procedures cost more than the harms they are designed to regulate.  Just as the 
lawyers in Dickens’ novel exhausted an estate with endless motions and arguments, a 
public or private enforcement system can become a full employment program for 
lawyers and regulators.  Although the private litigation system is vulnerable to this 
critique, it is less so than the public enforcement system.  The reason is that private 
enforcers are capable of waiving their rights ex ante (i.e., before any harm occurs) or 
agreeing to a cheaper dispute resolution forum and they, unlike public enforcement 
agents, have socially correct incentives to do so. 
 To see this, suppose the cost of legitimate disposal is $5,000 (per injury case) 
for the Midnight Dumper.  If he were strictly liable for the each injury, he clearly 
would choose to dispose legally rather than dump illegally – since the former costs 
$5,000 (in compliance costs) and the latter costs $10,000 (in liability).  Now suppose 
                                                 
8 For the general argument that this is what punitive damages are designed to do, and specific 
examples in the case law, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of 
Penalties, 87 GEO. L. J. 421 (1998). 
9 W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational?  Evidence from Hazardous 
Waste Cleanup Decisions, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 1010, 1021 (1999). 
10 See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000). 
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that the enforcement system also imposes “monitoring costs” on the firm of $10,000.  
In other words, even if the firm disposes of the chemicals legally, it must still pay 
(on a per injury basis) $5000 in avoidance costs and $10,000 in monitoring costs.  If 
the firm disposes illegally it will have to pay $10,000 in damages (per injury) and an 
additional $15,000 in inspection and defense costs.  In this case the firm will have an 
incentive under private enforcement to pay potential enforcers/victims up front in 
exchange for an agreement either waiving the victims’ legal rights or setting up a 
less expensive enforcement system.  Note that if the firm dumps illegally, its cost 
will be $25,000.11  If it does not dump, its cost will be $15,000.12  Clearly, the firm 
will choose compliance over dumping.  But a superior choice for all parties is to sign 
a contract in which the potential victim-enforcer accepts $11,000 in exchange for an 
agreement not to bring a claim.  This is the best choice for both the potential injurer, 
who saves $4,000, and the potential victim, who gains $1,000. 
 The overdeterrence problem can be solved, as this discussion suggests, by 
switching from a public-with-controls to a public-with-prices (or taxes) regime.  That 
has been the traditional case for regulating through taxes rather than command and 
control regimes.  The argument for the common law regime advanced here goes a bit 
further.  The novel part of this argument is that the Bleak House problem can be 
solved also, while at the same time providing private enforcers with appropriate 
incentives to hunt down and prosecute violations.  The private litigation system has 
both advantages over the public enforcement systems.13 
 I have described the public malfeasance argument in terms of enforcement 
incentives.  However, the malfeasance problem goes quite a bit deeper, and this 
suggests another argument in favor of the common law regime.  Consider the 
framing of a regulatory system.  The common law regime gave us a flexible, 
undefined structure.  There are general rules in tort law, but no bright lines saying 
that certain types of injury cannot be brought into court.14  The statutory process has 
more structure and definition, and often involves rules specifying the claims that can 
be compensated or conduct that will be immunized from liability. 
 This difference, between a system governed by the actions of private parties 
operating under general principles and a system controlled by certain actors framing 
targeted rules, makes the statutory regime relatively vulnerable to a deeper type of 
malfeasance problem.  The firms who are likely to be regulated by a certain type of 
law – an environmental statute – have every incentive to bribe the legislators in order 
to shape rules to their liking.  The legislators are motivated, as always, to meet the 
demands of their constituents.  But constituents cannot see the fine print in 
legislation, while concentrated interest groups, specifically the regulated firms, can.  
                                                 
11 The sum of $10,000 in liability and $15,000 in defense costs. 
12 The sum of $5,000 in compliance costs and $10,000 in inspection costs. 
13 This is a response to the argument that public-with-controls is potentially superior where the cost of 
enforcing a public-with-prices regime is relatively high, see Edward L. Gleaser & Andrei Shleifer, A 
Case for Quantity Regulation, HIER Discussion Paper Number 1909, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=256743.  My disagreement with the Gleaser and Shleifer 
argument is that the probability of determining compliance is often endogenous, in the sense that it 
depends on the incentives to find violations.  The private system is potentially superior because it 
rewards enforcers for finding violations. 
14 Richard Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982). 
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This system is likely to produce regulatory legislation that seems on its face to 
impose harsh controls while under the surface providing significant protective 
shields to the regulated industry. 
This is arguably what has happened in the case of tobacco regulation.  
Although tobacco companies have been taxed and regulated (e.g., advertising) for 
several decades now, I don't think anyone believes that they were under any serious 
threat of being forced to make significant changes in their conduct under the 
statutory regulation regime.  They had made their peace with Congress and the state 
legislatures, and they did not anticipate substantially stricter regulation or higher 
taxes.  This state of affairs changed only when tobacco became a major subject of 
tort litigation in the past three years. 
 More generally, the statutory scheme is one in which we should anticipate 
laws that favor pressure groups over dispersed, unorganized parties.  We should not 
assume that the regulations will burden well-financed industry pressure groups, such 
as tobacco.  We should assume that dispersed landowners will lose out relative to 
organized environmental lobbies, as many have claimed happened with endangered 
species protection. 
 
B. Information 
 
The second argument for the common law regime owes a great deal to 
Hayek, who saw better than anyone else the importance of decentralized schemes to 
the discovery of private information.  Intelligent regulation has a utilitarian basis.  It 
does not require people to spend $5 to avoid losing $1.  Yet, in order to implement a 
utilitarian-defensible regulatory regime, we need information that is in the hands of 
private parties.  Public enforcement agents cannot obtain enough information to 
design an intelligent scheme without access to private information. 
 To see the importance of private information in an intelligent regulatory 
design, take the simple case of negligence.  Under the famous Learned Hand 
formula, a defendant will be held negligent if the burden of precaution is less than 
the avoided harms.  In medical malpractice, courts generally follow the custom of the 
profession rather than trying to compare the (untaken) precaution burden with the 
avoided harms. 
 As Holmes suggested and Posner later argued explicitly,15 the negligence 
system is a large regulatory scheme that has worked with some success.  Negligence 
liability works as a deterrent and it has not driven legitimate activity out of the 
country.16  The crucial feature that I want to highlight is its reliance on private 
                                                 
15 For Holmes’ arguments, see his chapters on tort law in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW (1881).  For Posner’s view, see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
16 There are several good empirical papers demonstrating the deterrent effect of liability.  For the most 
recent, and perhaps the best, see J. David Cummins, Richard D. Phillips, and Mary A. Weiss, The 
Incentive Effect of No Fault Automobile Insurance, working paper, Feb. 26, 2001, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=___.   See also, Frank A. Sloan, Lan Liang, Emily M. 
Stout, and Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein, Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J. 
LAW & ECON. 473 (2000) (evidence that tort liability affects monitoring of drinkers by bar operators); 
Scott E. Harrington &  Patricia M. Danzon, Rate Regulation, Safety Incentives, and Loss Growth in 
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information.  The plaintiff knows more about his injury than any other party.  The 
defendant knows more about his burden of precaution than anyone else.  The 
negligence system gives both parties an incentive to persuade the court that their 
version of the appropriate regulatory rule is appropriate.  Courts use their common 
knowledge, as well as information provided by the parties, to decide which parties’ 
version is more persuasive, and to determine general conduct norms that will apply 
to future cases.  In some cases, such as custom, a bright line rule favoring some 
defendants has emerged.  In others, e.g., res ipsa doctrine, a rule favoring plaintiffs 
has emerged. 
 What emerges from negligence litigation is a set of conduct norms that are 
shaped by the private information of parties.  Although courts decide only the 
individual cases in front of them, the decisions create precedents that shape specific 
conduct norms that apply to future cases.  A decision that a firm, or a professional, is 
not negligent in conforming to industry custom is both a regulatory rule and a 
judgment based on an assessment of private information in one case.  The court’s 
decision to uphold the custom is inseparable from its examination of the information 
brought in by the parties. 
 A public regulatory scheme could not hope to match the negligence system in 
terms of its scope, detail, and encapsulation of private information.  To do so would 
require public agents to discover ex ante how much a potential victim would be hurt 
by a specific injury, and how much it would cost a potential injurer to avoid the 
injury.  Even if the parties were able to provide this information ex ante, their 
incentives to do so honestly would be weak. 
The common law approach to environmental regulation, in large part 
embodied in nuisance law, reflects considerable sensitivity to private, local 
information.  Nuisance law can be criticized for being too local, in the sense that it 
does not aspire to create general regulatory rules, such as emission standards.  On the 
other hand, almost all reliable information is probably local.  Nuisance law holds a 
defendant liable only when he has “unreasonably interfered” with the use and 
enjoyment of land by another.  The unreasonable interference test appears to balance 
externalized benefits and externalized costs of the nuisance-generating activity.17  
Where there is reciprocal exchange, because the externalized benefits equal or 
exceed the externalized costs, courts do not find the interference unreasonable.18  
Courts find unreasonable interference only when reciprocity is violated because the 
externalized costs far exceed the externalized benefits.  Nuisance doctrine looks into 
the utility to the locale of the underlying activity in comparison to its costs, the 
capacity of the plaintiff to bear the loss, whether the defendant’s activity is common 
in the locale, the priority in time among competing activities, and the nature of the 
rights invaded. 
                                                                                                                                          
Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 73 J. OF BUSINESS 569 (2000)(empirical evidence that insurance 
rate regulation impacts accident rates); Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 49 
(1982). 
17 Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977 (1996). 
18 Id. at 993-1002.  For an analysis of pollution that focuses on the reciprocity issue, see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. J. 931 (1997). 
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 In the standard case of the smoke-belching factory, nuisance law is designed 
to take private information into account.  It has never been stated with the clarity 
found in negligence doctrine (due to Learned Hand’s Carroll Towing opinion), and 
this has been a source of controversy.  However, like negligence, it examines the 
plaintiff’s proof of harm, which requires provision of some private information.  The 
test, unlike negligence, seems to instruct courts to offset those harms by the unpaid-
for benefits plaintiffs get from being in the same locale as the nuisance generator.  
Thus, under both nuisance and Rylands doctrine, courts refuse to find defendants 
liable when they deem their activities to be sufficiently valuable to the locale.  No 
court has ever explained what this social utility comparison means, but the only 
sensible interpretation I can give to it is that it instructs courts to offset expected 
interference costs by the expected benefits externalized by the firm.  This gives the 
firm an incentive to provide information to the court on the cost to itself and to the 
locale if it were forced to reduce the scale of its operations.  And since nuisance 
litigation takes place in an adversary setting, the opposing party has an incentive to 
provide private information to the court challenging the cost-benefit assessments of a 
litigant.19 
 The externalized costs of a nuisance are obvious.  The externalized benefits 
are not obvious, though courts have referred to them indirectly in many decisions.  In 
the case of the smoke-belching factory its presence attracts factory customers and 
suppliers.  This provides an external benefit to other businesses in the same locale 
that rely on some of the customers or suppliers of the factory.  For these other 
businesses, the demand for their goods and services increases and the cost of 
procuring supplies and employees falls.  Indeed, the external benefit may take the 
form of the lower costs all parties incur when they agree to accept reciprocal low-
level invasions without resorting to litigation.  The same is true of families living in 
the area: their wages rise and their living costs, measured as the cost of finding items 
in a standard consumption basket, falls.  The benefits to businesses and consumers 
can be described as agglomeration externalities, and they can be priced.20 
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp.,21 one of the cases taught in first year torts 
course, serves as an example of how courts apply the unreasonable interference test.  
Waste substances from the defendant’s oil refinery escaped from the defendant’s 
land by underground percolation.  As a result, the well and stream on the plaintiff’s 
land became polluted with gasoline, and some of his farm animals were killed.  The 
court held that the interference was not unreasonable given the knowledge, locality, 
and social value components of the nuisance test.  The court noted that the plant was 
“situated in the heart of a region that is highly developed industrially” and that 
                                                 
19 Though dealing with a different problem, one of Merrill’s arguments for a reciprocity norm in 
transboundary pollution disputes is that it forces out more private information.  My suspicion is that 
the arguments in favor of the reciprocity norm applied in nuisance disputes extend to the case of 
transboundary pollution (and conversely).  A more general attack on the issue would show that both 
pollution problems, within- and across-boundary, can be regulated under the same nuisance principles 
appropriately modified. 
20 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 
(1991).  For a more recent contribution to the literature on the economics of industrialization, see 
Edward L. Glaeser and David C. Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LABOR ECON. 316 (2001). 
21 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934). 
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“individual rights recognized in a sparsely settled state have to be surrendered for the 
benefit of the community as it develops and expands.”22  Although the plaintiff’s 
injury was substantial, the court’s conclusion that there was no unreasonable 
interference is justifiable on the ground that in expectation, there probably was a 
reciprocal exchange of low level invasions among the activities in the plaintiff’s 
locale.  If the plaintiff’s activity, farming, were unusually sensitive given the locale, 
it would have no right to claim damages under nuisance doctrine. 
 Although nuisance law does not aim to generate global emission standards, 
nothing in this framework suggests that this could not be the result.  As a population 
grows richer, it will demand more in terms of environmental quality.  The 
comparison of expected externalized costs and externalized benefits will change over 
time in favor of stricter regulations on smoke-belching factories.  In this sense 
nuisance law can be viewed as a regulatory framework that encourages development 
in early phases, and then places greater restrictions later as the demand for 
environmental quality increases. 
 I noted that nuisance doctrine is controversial, and the same is true of 
Rylands doctrine, because both involve a social utility evaluation that many courts 
and commentators find troubling.  The problem here, in my view, is not so much 
what courts have done, but their failure to explain what they have been doing.  
Nuisance law suffers from not having had a Learned Hand do for it what he did for 
negligence law. 
Because of the squeamishness observers have about the social utility 
component of nuisance and Rylands doctrine, the American Law Institute is in the 
process, in the Restatement (Third) drafts, of weeding it out of the law.  In its place, 
the nuisance and Rylands tests, as described the Restatement, will rely largely on the 
locality or commonality criterion, i.e., whether the defendant’s activity is common in 
the locale.23  This is a questionable move for several reasons.  First, there are 
activities that may be common and yet their expected externalized benefits may be 
far less than their externalized costs.  Suppose, for example, we were to discover in 
the future that microwave radiation from cell phone towers causes significant 
injuries.  Since cell phone towers are common today in most places, they will satisfy 
the locality criterion in the new Restatement test.  The new Restatement tests may 
effectively immunize these activities from strict liability under nuisance and Rylands 
doctrine, provided courts are persuaded to adopt the new interpretations. 
 The second reason to question the Restatement (Third)’s attempt to weed out 
social utility tests is that there may be cases in which the social value of the 
defendant’s activity is substantial, but it is not common.  The best examples are zoos 
                                                 
22 Id. at 631. 
23 In addition to the locality criterion, Rylands and nuisance doctrine under the new Restatement will 
rely on another factor: inability of the actor to eliminate the risk by the exercise of due care.  This 
latter factor was emphasized in Judge Posner’s treatment of Rylands doctrine in Indiana Harbor Belt 
R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).  Posner, relying on Steven 
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1980), suggested that the inability factor 
should be the key determinant of strict liability, and largely ignored the social comparison and 
appropriateness-to-place factors in Rylands doctrine.  The new Restatement is on a course to replace 
traditional Rylands and nuisance doctrine with the Posner-Shavell approach. 
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and wildlife parks, which generally have been examined under negligence principles.  
The new Restatement’s Rylands test could lead to a different result in these cases. 
 
IV. COMMON LAW VERSUS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
 
I have suggested that the common law is preferable to statutory 
environmental protection regimes given the malfeasance and information-discovery 
problems of any enforcement system.  Surely, one might respond, there is a limit to 
this argument.  For example, one cannot imagine private class action suits being 
brought against the owners of polluting cars.  I concede that there is a limit to my 
argument, and that the real question is precisely where the common law regime 
dominates the statutory enforcement framework. 
 I think it is easy to lay out some general principles.  Public enforcement is 
preferable to private lawsuits in the cases of (1) real environmental crimes, (2) 
judgment proof defendants, and (3) low detection probabilities.  By “real crimes” I 
am referring to the cases in which someone poisons the environment with the intent 
of harming people – e.g., intentionally poisoning a community water source.  Public 
enforcement is desirable in this case for the same reasons seen in the criminal law in 
general.  Criminals tend to hide their activity and many are dangerous until they are 
incarcerated.  It would make no sense to rely on private lawsuits to control this type 
of behavior. 
 The desirability of public enforcement in the case of judgment-proof 
offenders is also based on the same reasons that we see in the criminal law.  Even if 
we could identify and find the judgment-proof polluters, they would not be able to 
pay for the total damages.  Since they cannot pay the full cost, they would not be 
deterred by liability, and few plaintiffs would have an incentive to sue them anyway.  
Consider (again) the case of individuals who drive cars or trucks that put out filthy 
exhaust fumes. 
 The low detection-probability case is probably the most general category in 
which public enforcement seems desirable.  I have in mind cases in which the (1) 
identity of the pollution source is difficult to determine and (2) the nature of the harm 
requires research.  The identification problem is captured in the Midnight Dumper 
example discussed earlier.  In cases in which substantial resources must be invested 
into discovering the source of pollution, we should not expect the private lawsuit 
mechanism to work as a significant deterrent, for reasons we have already covered.  
The second case, in which the nature of the harm is difficult to determine, is 
illustrated by the emission standards we now have.  Private individuals would be 
unwilling to invest resources into determining appropriate emission standards, or 
even to identify the potential pollutants that should be controlled. 
 Outside of these general cases, there should be a preference for private 
enforcement through the common law.  Indeed, private enforcement or prosecution, 
in the sense of bringing a lawsuit, should be the rule even in the low detection 
probability cases, since the public role can be limited to the detection of the source or 
harm.  This approach suggests a regime in which public agencies exist largely as a 
source of information and as residual or last-resort enforcer for those cases in which 
private parties are not up to the task.  Standing the current regime on its head, public 
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agencies would spend much of their prosecution resources on small cases, leaving 
private parties to sue the large corporations. 
 The one major topic that needs to be addressed is that of emission standards.  
Under the principles suggested here, they would have to be determined by a public 
agency.  But how should they be determined and how should they be enforced?  
More to the point, what is the difference between an emission standard and a garden-
variety nuisance?  The emission standard problem forces us to try to determine the 
relationships among nuisance law, property rights, and statutory environmental 
regulations. 
 
V. LOCAL VERSUS GLOBAL STANDARDS 
 
I have tried to stick with simple examples because I am not a specialist in 
environmental law.  In keeping with this approach, let me describe two types of 
emission standards problem.  The first is that of the smoke-belching factory.  
Nuisance law has dealt with this problem, providing a flexible regulatory framework 
that has allowed for variation over time and across regions.  I will refer to this as the 
problem of defining a local emission standard. 
There are many cases that create new local emission standard problems, some 
of which are regulated by federal agencies.  Consider cell phone towers.  The issue is 
whether the microwave emissions from these towers present health risks to nearby 
landowners or users.  The federal government, specifically the FCC, regulates these 
towers and prohibits lawsuits challenging health effects under the federal emission 
standard.  The cell tower problem is entirely local in the sense that the health risks, if 
they are substantial, impact people who live, work, or go to school close to these 
towers.  In other words, there is no sense in which the government has to set a global 
emission standard in order to prevent some community from emitting so much 
microwave radiation that it adversely affects the health of other communities. 
 The second type of emission problem involves the case in which a global 
standard is arguably necessary.  Consider the emission of a greenhouse gas, such as 
carbon dioxide.  The controversial Kyoto treaty involves a large-scale effort to set a 
truly global limit on the emission of greenhouse gases.  We are not worried with 
local emissions in this setting.  Unlike the cell phone tower case, the greenhouse gas 
problem does not involve NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) arguments.  The concern 
here is that everyone might be complying with a standard that works well in each 
local community, and yet the total emission of greenhouse gases may be too much.  
The total emission may be so great that it traps heat in the atmosphere, raising 
temperatures over time, which, in turn, may produce worrisome environmental 
consequences in the long run. 
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A. Local Emission Standards 
 
Nuisance law is both capable and a preferable method of enforcing local 
emission standards.24  This is not a controversial claim in the case of the smoke-
belching factory, since nuisance law has dealt with these cases for many years.  It is 
more controversial in the case of the cell tower, because the tower is operating under 
a federal emission standard.  A superior regime, in my view, would not preempt 
nuisance suits challenging the effects of emissions that meet a federal standard.  
People who live or work near cell towers, for example, should be allowed to bring 
nuisance suits challenging the health effects of microwave emissions from the 
towers. 
 In the case of cell towers, the existing regulatory scheme reveals both of the 
malfeasance and information problems that make public statute-based regulatory 
schemes inferior to the common law in important respects.  Because one federal 
agency, the FCC, controls the emission standard, we have to worry about whether 
this agency will be captured by the regulated parties.  At the least, its standard should 
not be held to preempt local tort suits unless courts can be confident that the standard 
was set by a group of independent experts rather than industry insiders.  The 
information problems are also troubling in this case.  The health effects of emission 
standards clearly will vary depending on the nature of the area in which the tower is 
sited.  If the tower is set on a roadside surrounded by a forest, there will not be any 
serious health effects.  On other hand, if the tower is sited next to a grade school, we 
should be more concerned. 
 One response to this concern is that the FCC has set a standard for cell towers 
that is safe for all locations, no matter what the surrounding land uses.  Even if this 
were true, we should still be concerned as a systemic matter with a regulatory 
structure that removes power from communities to regulate on the basis of local 
information.  And the total safety claim is a doubtful proposition anyway.  With 
every technology that involves some risk, the question is always a comparison of 
costs and benefits.  Even if the probability of an injury is extremely low, we should 
consider the expected harm, conditional on an injury, in deciding whether the 
benefits outweigh the costs.  It is hard to see how local information could be 
considered irrelevant to this test. 
 There is a converse proposition to my claim that all local emission problems, 
even those regulated by the federal government, should be subject to nuisance 
litigation.  It is that federal regulation that goes too far, in the sense of going well 
beyond what is justifiable in terms of nuisance law, should also be subject to 
challenge.  In order to force landowners to comply with a regulation that goes well 
beyond the requirements of nuisance law, the federal government should provide 
compensation.  For example, a statute prohibiting the siting of a cell phone tower on 
private property would require compensation as a taking, unless the government 
could show that the tower would be a potential nuisance in its area. 
                                                 
24 Though examining a different problem – zoning – this is pretty much the conclusion Bob Ellickson 
offered in 1973.  Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
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B. Global Emission Standards 
 
Let us return to the problem of regulating global emission standards, such as 
one governing the emission of greenhouse gases.  The global emission standard 
problem is new.  Nuisance law has not dealt with the problem of defining global 
standards.25  The global standard problem is also quite general, and seems to be at 
the core of endangered species protection.  To take the notion to its logical extreme, 
suppose we were to pass a law regulating the destruction of “carbon dioxide” sinks – 
trees and big plants.  A landowner would not be able to chop down a tree in his yard 
without getting the approval of the government.  At this level of regulation the notion 
of property rights seems meaningless.  This example suggests that it is difficult to get 
far on the notion of global emission standards without confronting the property rights 
issue. 
 Is it possible to use lawsuits to enforce global emission standards?  Frank 
Michelman looked at this question many years ago.26  The approach I will suggest 
looks similar to his, though with important differences.  Michelman was concerned 
with applying Calabresi’s framework to environmental law.  The private class action 
lawsuit, in which victims sue to collect fines determined in advance by a government 
agency, works in Michelman’s framework as an efficient, reliable cost 
internalization mechanism.  The government should be able to determine appropriate 
internalizing fines under this scheme, given that some research into health costs had 
to go into the setting of an emission standard in the first place.  Using this research, 
fines could be determined so that they internalize the incremental cost of a violation 
of the emission standard. 
 The more troubling problem in my view, and where I differ from Michelman, 
is trying to decide the role traditional nuisance doctrine should play in such a 
scheme.  Michelman’s scheme assigns no role to traditional nuisance doctrine.  I 
think traditional nuisance doctrine should continue to play a role, the same role it 
played in my cell tower example.  Communities should be allowed to challenge 
emission standards as inadequate on nuisance grounds.  Thus, even if a firm 
complies with emission standards, it could still be found liable for a nuisance.  
Alternatively, regulated parties should be allowed to challenge the same standards on 
nuisance grounds, though subject to a higher standard of proof.  If the regulated party 
wins its suit, the government would be required to compensate the regulated party in 
order to continue to demand compliance with the standard.  The trading of emission 
rights can be folded into this framework easily.  If a firm buys additional rights from 
another firm, it will still be subject to nuisance litigation if it creates a serious local 
interference with property rights. 
 My proposal differs from Michelman’s by using nuisance law to maintain 
background property rights.  The concern my scheme addresses is that of 
government that sets a standard that effectively destroys a significant property right.  
                                                 
25 And nuisance law is arguably incapable of being the sole regulatory mechanism in this setting, see 
Ellickson, supra note 23, at 761. 
26 Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi’s Costs, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 647 (1971). 
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For example, in the case of law regulating the destruction of carbon sinks, the 
regulated party would have the right under my proposal to challenge the law on 
nuisance grounds.  If the regulated party succeeds, the government would have to 
either compensate him for the taking imposed by the law, or exempt him from 
compliance.  Conversely, if because of the political influence of producers or a 
certain community (e.g., Midwestern utilities) the global standard were set too low,27 
a community could challenge the regulated parties’ emissions on nuisance grounds. 
 The reader may recognize this proposal as a generalized version of the 
regulatory takings doctrine suggested by Justice Antonin Scalia in his Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council opinion.28  It employs nuisance law as an equilibrating 
mechanism on government regulation.  Nuisance law protects property rights while 
at the same time preventing certain intangible invasions of these rights.  Its utilitarian 
structure provides a test for determining when such invasions go too far and when 
regulations go too far.  If a government agency attempts to force a landowner to 
supply a public good, as opposed to the prevention of a public harm, the nuisance 
model requires public subsidization of this supply in the form of compensation.  
Conversely, if because of malfeasance in the legislative or enforcement process 
government enforcers fail to regulate appropriately, nuisance law provides a ready 
regulatory backup in the form of damages liability. 
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Like negligence law, nuisance law is a sophisticated, information-rich 
regulatory scheme that has evolved over many years of trial and error.  By balancing 
external costs and external benefits, it has protected rights to develop and to enjoy 
property, without presenting a serious obstacle to economic growth.  Environmental 
law has taken a different track, relying on statutes and minimizing the common law’s 
input.  Nuisance law has advantages over the statutory framework in terms of its 
treatment of local information and enforcement incentives.  I have suggested that 
environmental law enforcement could be improved by returning to some of the 
principles embodied in nuisance law. 
 
 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 18, at 982 (“Acid rain in the United States is a complex transboundary 
pollution problem in which Midwestern states … are seen as predominant source states, and states in 
New England and Adirondack regions are seen primarily as affected states.  For nearly two decades, 
the Midwestern states consistently blocked any meaningful federal regulation of acid rain, because 
they perceived that their citizens would end up paying higher utility bills while the benefits would 
largely inure to the citizens of New England and Adirondack states.”) 
28 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
